antitrust and trade regulation bulletin FTC Releases Report on Intellectual Property and Antitrust by Burling, James et al.
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust Series
Year  Paper 
antitrust and trade regulation bulletin FTC
Releases Report on Intellectual Property and
Antitrust
James Burling∗ John C. Christie Jr.†
Michelle Miller‡
∗WilmerHale
†
‡
This working paper is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commer-
cially reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.
http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art35
Copyright c©2003 by the authors.
antitrust and trade regulation bulletin FTC
Releases Report on Intellectual Property and
Antitrust
James Burling, John C. Christie Jr., and Michelle Miller
Abstract
Last year the FTC and the Department of Justice jointly held hearings focused
on the current balance of competition and patent law and policy. (See our Decem-
ber, 2001 Antitrust and Trade Regulation Bulletin at www.haledorr.com/antitrust.)
The hearings spanned more than 24 days, involving more than 300 panelists and
100 separate written submissions. The first tangible by-product of those sessions
came on October 28, 2003, with the release of a 266-page FTC report containing
specific recommendations for changes in the existing patent system (the Patent Re-
port)(http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/creport .htm). A second, joint report with
DOJ, containing specific recommendations for antitrust, is promised for the fu-
ture.
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Anthony. Commissioner Harbour, an independent,
has most recently been in private practice and is
a former New York assistant first deputy attorney
general. Her term extends until September 2009.
Joseph J. Simmons recently resigned his position
as the director of the Bureau of Competition.
Simmons presided over 60 enforcement actions
during his two years at the Commission, including
25 non-merger cases and two challenges to
consummated mergers. Susan Creighton has
been named the new director of the Bureau of
Competition. Creighton has been deputy director
since August 2001, when she joined the FTC.
She previously clerked for Judge Pamela Ann
Rymer in the Central District of California and
Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.
Barry Nigro, Ann Malester and Bruce Hoffman
all have become deputy directors of the Bureau
of Competition. Nigro joins the FTC from private
practice. Malester has led one of the merger
groups within the FTC for a number of years.
Hoffman has been the associate director for
regional litigation for the past two years.
David Scheffman resigned his position as director
of the Bureau of Economics. Scheffman, who
served as director for two years, will return to the
private sector as an economic consultant and
adjunct professor at Vanderbilt University. Luke
Froeb will replace Scheffman. Froeb joins the
FTC from the Owen Graduate School of
Management at Vanderbilt University. Froeb was
previously an economist with the Antitrust Division.
The FTC recently enhanced its intellectual property
expertise, evidencing yet more institutional interest
in this subject. Armando Irizarry and Thomas
Mays joined as counsels for intellectual property.
Irizarry comes from Michigan State University,
where he was teaching law.
Mays joins the Commission from private practice
and was previously a patent examiner at the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office.
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FTC Releases Report on
Intellectual Property and
Antitrust
Last year the FTC and the Department of Justice
jointly held hearings focused on the current
balance of competition and patent law and policy.
(See our December, 2001 Antitrust and Trade
Regulation Bulletin at www.haledorr.com/antitrust.)
The hearings spanned more than 24 days,
involving more than 300 panelists and 100
separate written submissions. The first tangible
by-product of those sessions came on October
28, 2003, with the release of a 266-page FTC
report containing specific recommendations for
changes in the existing patent system (the Patent
Report)(http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/creport
.htm). A second, joint report with DOJ, containing
specific recommendations for antitrust, is promised
for the future.  
The Patent Report begins with a general discussion
of the common aims of both competition and
patent law and policy. Competition stimulates
innovation by spurring the innovation of new or
better products or more efficient processes. Patent
policy can also stimulate innovation by rewarding
the innovator with a right to exclude others from
making, using or selling the invention claimed by
the patent. As the FTC sees it, the two systems
are not inherently in conflict, but any failure to
strike the appropriate balance between them can
harm innovation.
Although the Patent Report states that “for the
most part” the patent system achieves a proper
balance with competition policy, it concludes that
in some ways the system is “out of balance.” As
a result, the report makes a number of specific
recommendations for reforming the legal systems,
procedures and institutions of the patent system.
Most, but not all, of the proposals would require
enabling legislation. The FTC’s recommendations
include the following:
1. Measures should be implemented to reduce
the number of invalid patents issued or those that
contain claims that are overly broad. These poor
quality or questionable patents can cause
competitors to forgo R&D in the areas the patent
improperly covers, and can increase the practice
of “defensive patenting,” contribute to the “patent
FTC recommends
sweeping changes
in the balance
between competition
and patent law.
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New FTC report addresses the antitrust
implications of current patent law and policy
Circuit courts differ over antitrust analysis
of patent litigation settlements
FTC issues new policy statement on monetary
remedies in competition cases
ABA releases third edition of HSR Manual
Personnel changes at DOJ and FTC
remedies available are likely to fail to fully
accomplish the purposes of the antitrust laws.
For parties to consummated mergers challenged
after closing, for example, this means that the
agency may seek not only to dissolve the
transaction but also, in “exceptional”
circumstances, to have the parties repay profits
earned while operating as a merged company.
However, as with all such statements of policy,
the true import of this pronouncement will not be
known until the FTC puts it into practice.
ABA Publishes Updated
HSR Manual
The Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar
Association has published the third edition of the
Premerger Notification Practice Manual. The
manual provides summaries and discussions of
both the informal interpretations of the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR
or the Act) given by the Premerger Notification
Office of the Federal Trade Commission (PNO)
and enforcement actions brought by the antitrust
agencies related to the Act. Hy David Rubenstein
of Hale and Dorr LLP’s Antitrust and Trade
Regulation Group, formerly an attorney with the
PNO, was a member of the working group that
developed and edited the third edition.
The Act authorizes the PNO to provide informal,
typically oral, interpretations as well as formal
written interpretations of HSR issues. Although
the PNO has issued only 17 formal written
interpretations in the 27 years since the Act was
passed, the office has issued thousands of informal
oral interpretations. Many of these oral
interpretations have been confirmed in written
correspondence to the PNO. These written
confirmations formed the basis of the first two
editions of the manual, published in 1985 and
1991. This third edition of the manual continues
to be the most comprehensive published source
for such information to date. In addition, the
editors of this edition collaborated with the PNO
on the preparation of a discussion of other issues
that have not been the subject of written
confirmation.
Although the manual brings the materials
completely up-to-date, incorporating the PNO’s
latest positions on various issues and adding
summaries of interpretations relating to changes
that have occurred in the HSR laws since 1991,
new rules and interpretations of the Act are
constantly occurring. As a result, parties requiring
advice on HSR issues should continue to consult
with antitrust counsel.
Personnel Changes at Both
Antitrust Agencies
Department of Justice
Bruce McDonald recently joined the DOJ and will
serve as the deputy assistant attorney general for
regulatory matters in the Antitrust Division,
overseeing airline, transportation, energy and
other regulatory matters. McDonald was formerly
in private practice. Robert Kramer, a career
attorney with the Division and for many years
chief of one of its litigation sections, succeeds
Connie Robinson as director of operations.
Deborah Majoras, principal deputy attorney
general for Antitrust, recently announced her
intention to leave DOJ and is expected to rejoin
the private bar next year. Majoras joined the
Division in the spring of 2001 and was involved
in the General Electric–Honeywell International
and Microsoft cases.
Federal Trade Commission
Commissioner Sheila Foster Anthony served on
the Commission for nearly six years until her term
expired recently. Often a dissenting voice,
Commissioner Anthony disagreed with other
commissioners in the cruise industry consolidation,
and in the PepsiCo–Quaker Oats (Gatorade) and
General Mills–Pillsbury merger decisions. Pamela
Jones Harbour recently replaced Commissioner
5
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Both the
Department of
Justice and Federal
Trade Commission
have experienced
numerous personnel
changes in recent
months.
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Obviously many of these recommendations would
result in significant changes to both patent law
and practice, affecting a wide variety of industries.
Whether Congress shares the FTC’s concerns,
and is ready to enact major legislation to address
those concerns, remains to be seen.
Circuits Disagree over Per
Se Treatment of Agreements to
Settle Patent Infringement Suits
Two United States circuit courts of appeals have
reached opposite conclusions regarding the
appropriate antitrust analysis to apply to a payment
by a patent holder to an alleged infringer in settling
patent infringement litigation. First, in June, the
Sixth Circuit found such payments (and the
settlement agreements incorporating them) to be
per se illegal under the antitrust laws. In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, No. 00-24836
(6th Cir. June 13, 2003). More recently, the
Eleventh Circuit declined to find similar a patent
infringement settlement per se illegal even though
the patent holder paid the alleged infringers and
the patent was later held invalid. Valley Drug Co.
v. Geneva Pharma., No. 02-12091 (11th Cir. Sept
15, 2003). The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged
that its analysis ran contrary to the Sixth Circuit.
The split in the circuits on this issue may ultimately
invite Supreme Court review.
In the case before the Sixth Circuit, Hoescht
Marion Roussel, the manufacturer of the
prescription drug Cardizem CD, sued Andrx
Pharmaceuticals—then a potential manufacturer
of a generic version of that drug—in January
1996, alleging patent infringement. While the
litigation was pending, the FDA approved the
generic version, allowing it to go to market at the
latest in July 1998 and perhaps sooner if the
litigation resulted in a finding of non-infringement.
Shortly after the FDA decision, the two companies
entered an interim agreement by which the
branded manufacturer agreed to pay the generic
manufacturer $40 million per year, payable
quarterly, from July 1998 until the termination of
the litigation. In return, the generic manufacturer
agreed not to bring its generic product to market
even though, under the law, the generic product
could have been marketed from that date forward
(subject, of course, to damages for infringement
if the litigation resulted in a finding of patent
infringement).
The litigation finally ended in June 1999 when
the FDA approved a reformulated version of the
generic drug that the generic manufacturer
certified did not infringe the patent at issue. With
that approval, the two companies settled the
litigation, with the branded manufacturer paying
nearly $51 million in additional funds to the generic
manufacturer.
On a motion for partial summary judgment, the
district court determined that the interim
agreement was an illegal restraint of trade and
certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. The
Sixth Circuit held that the interim agreement was
“a naked horizontal restraint of trade that is per
se illegal because it is presumed to have the effect
of reducing competition in the market for [the
branded drug] and its generic equivalents to the
detriment of consumers.” In re Cardizem, No.
00-24836 (6th Cir. June 12, 2003). The court
concluded that the agreement was of the type
that predictably resulted in antitrust injury because
at its core it eliminated competition in the market
for the drug.
In so finding, the court refused to accept a
characterization of the agreement as an attempt
to enforce a patent or to settle litigation. Instead,
it saw the agreement as a way for the branded
manufacturer to share its monopoly profits with
its only potential competitor in an effort to prolong
the patent monopoly as long as possible. “[I]t is
one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that
naturally arises from a patent, but another thing
altogether to bolster the patent’s effectiveness in
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thicket” and create licensing complexities and
costs. In order to address this issue, the Patent
Report recommends a variety of changes in the
existing patent system:
a) The first change would be the introduction of
legislation to create a new administrative
procedure to allow post-grant review of, and
opposition to, patents. This procedure would
be designed to allow for meaningful challenges
to patent validity short of federal court litigation.
b) The second change would be the enactment
of legislation to modify the legal standard
governing challenges to the validity of a patent
from the present “clear and convincing
evidence” to a “preponderance of the
evidence.” According to the Patent Report,
the existing circumstances surrounding the
issuance of a patent by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) suggest that an
overly strong presumption of a patent’s validity
is inappropriate.
c) The third recommended change is a general
tightening in the legal standards used to
evaluate whether an invention is “obvious”
or not, in order to better assure that a
development is significant enough to merit
a patent.
d) Lastly, the Patent Report proposes that the
PTO be provided with the funding necessary
to address issues of patent quality, and that
various PTO procedural rules and regulations
be modified to enable it to improve the process
of patent issuance.
2. Legislation should be enacted to require the
publication of all patent applications 18 months
after the filing of the application. During the time
that otherwise passes between the filing of a
patent application and the issuance of a patent,
an applicant’s competitor could have invested
substantially in designing and developing a product
and bringing it to market, only to discover, once
the patent had finally issued, that it was infringing.
Relatively recently, the law was changed to require
the publishing of all patent applications except
those filed only within the United States. The
Patent Report recommends the elimination of this
exception to publication, in the interests of
increasing business certainty and promoting
rational planning.
3. Legislation should be enacted to create
intervening or prior user rights to protect parties
from infringement allegations that rely on patent
claims first introduced in a continuing or other
similar patent application. The Patent Report
concludes that, if the patent applicant uses
procedures such as continuing applications to
extend the period of patent prosecution, the
potential for anticompetitive hold-up increases.
Intervening or prior-user rights should shelter
inventors and users that infringe a patent only as
a result of claim amendments following a
continuation, provided that the sheltered invention
was developed and used before the amended
claims were published.
4. Legislation should be enacted to require—as
a predicate for liability for willful infringement—
a patentee to either show actual, written notice
of infringement, or to demonstrate that the infringer
deliberately copied the patentee’s invention,
knowing it to be patented. According to the Patent
Report, this requirement would allow firms to read
patents for their disclosure value and to survey
the patent landscape without risking liability for
willful infringement.
5. Finally, the FTC promises to take steps to
increase communication between the antitrust
agencies and the patent institutions. These steps
will include filing amicus briefs in important patent
cases, asking the PTO Director to reexamine
questionable patents that raise competitive
concerns and establishing a Liaison Panel between
the FTC, the DOJ and the PTO.
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Many of the FTC’s
recommendations
would result
in significant
changes to both
patent law
and practice.
Conflicting court
rulings leave
significant
unresolved
questions
surrounding
the status of
patent settlements.
inhibiting competition by paying the only potential
competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the
market.” Id.
The challenged agreement in Valley Drug was not
significantly different from the one in Cardizem
in essential respects. In Valley Drug, Abbott
Laboratories, the branded manufacturer, sued
two generic manufacturers—Zenith Goldline
Pharmaceuticals and Geneva Pharmaceuticals—
for patent infringement as they were pursuing
FDA approval for their generic versions of Abbott’s
pioneer drug, Hytrin. Before the termination of
the infringement litigation, Abbott, Zenith and
Geneva entered into interim agreements by which
the generics agreed not to enter the market and
Abbott agreed to make substantial periodic
payments. The payments were to be reduced in
the event another generic entered the market and
were to cease if Abbott ultimately won its patent
suit. Abbott, however, lost the patent litigation at
the district court level in 1998 and after appeal
in 1999. In apparent response to an FTC
investigation, the agreements were terminated in
August 1999.
Unlike the Cardizem court, the Valley Drug court
determined that the alleged exclusionary aspects
of the agreements “are at the heart of the patent
right and cannot trigger the per se label.” Id. In
reversing a grant of partial summary judgment
by the district court, the Eleventh Circuit found
that, because the patent gave Abbott the right to
exclusively market its drug until 2014, any
agreement merely continuing its right to exclusivity
did not necessarily impair competition. “If Abbott
had a lawful right to exclude competitors, it is not
obvious that competition was limited more than
that lawful degree by paying potential competitors
for their exit.” Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharma.,
No. 02-12091 (11th Cir. Sept 15, 2003).
The fact that Abbott’s patent had later been
determined to be invalid was of no relevance to
the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis because the
reasonableness of such agreements is to be
judged at the time the agreements were entered
into. “Exposing settling parties to antitrust liability
for the exclusionary effects of a settlement
reasonably within the scope of the patent merely
because the patent is subsequently declared invalid
would undermine the patent incentives.” Id.
As a result, the case was remanded to the district
court to determine the actual competitive effects
of the agreements in light of all the circumstances.
“To hold that an ostensibly reasonable settlement
of patent litigation gives rise to per se antitrust
liability if it involves any payment by the patentee
would obviously chill such settlements, thereby
increasing the cost of patent enforcement and
decreasing the value of patent protection
generally.” Id.
These two conflicting opinions create considerable
uncertainty for parties settling patent infringement
suits (or entering into agreements pending the
outcome of the litigation) in similar circumstances.
They suggest the need for great care in crafting
such settlements because both private litigation
and government investigations may result.
FTC Clarifies Use of Monetary
Remedies in Competition
Cases
The FTC recently issued a policy statement on
the use of monetary equitable remedies such as
disgorgement and restitution in competition cases.
While the Commission will continue to rely primarily
on traditional, prospective remedies, the statement
suggests that disgorgement and restitution will
be sought in “exceptional” circumstances. Three
factors are identified that will be considered in
this determination.  First, whether the underlying
violation is clear. Second, whether there is a
reasonable basis for calculating the amount of
the remedial payment. Third, whether other
4
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FTC policy statement
says challenged
consummated
mergers may be
subject to
disgorgement
in “exceptional”
circumstances.
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Obviously many of these recommendations would
result in significant changes to both patent law
and practice, affecting a wide variety of industries.
Whether Congress shares the FTC’s concerns,
and is ready to enact major legislation to address
those concerns, remains to be seen.
Circuits Disagree over Per
Se Treatment of Agreements to
Settle Patent Infringement Suits
Two United States circuit courts of appeals have
reached opposite conclusions regarding the
appropriate antitrust analysis to apply to a payment
by a patent holder to an alleged infringer in settling
patent infringement litigation. First, in June, the
Sixth Circuit found such payments (and the
settlement agreements incorporating them) to be
per se illegal under the antitrust laws. In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, No. 00-24836
(6th Cir. June 13, 2003). More recently, the
Eleventh Circuit declined to find similar a patent
infringement settlement per se illegal even though
the patent holder paid the alleged infringers and
the patent was later held invalid. Valley Drug Co.
v. Geneva Pharma., No. 02-12091 (11th Cir. Sept
15, 2003). The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged
that its analysis ran contrary to the Sixth Circuit.
The split in the circuits on this issue may ultimately
invite Supreme Court review.
In the case before the Sixth Circuit, Hoescht
Marion Roussel, the manufacturer of the
prescription drug Cardizem CD, sued Andrx
Pharmaceuticals—then a potential manufacturer
of a generic version of that drug—in January
1996, alleging patent infringement. While the
litigation was pending, the FDA approved the
generic version, allowing it to go to market at the
latest in July 1998 and perhaps sooner if the
litigation resulted in a finding of non-infringement.
Shortly after the FDA decision, the two companies
entered an interim agreement by which the
branded manufacturer agreed to pay the generic
manufacturer $40 million per year, payable
quarterly, from July 1998 until the termination of
the litigation. In return, the generic manufacturer
agreed not to bring its generic product to market
even though, under the law, the generic product
could have been marketed from that date forward
(subject, of course, to damages for infringement
if the litigation resulted in a finding of patent
infringement).
The litigation finally ended in June 1999 when
the FDA approved a reformulated version of the
generic drug that the generic manufacturer
certified did not infringe the patent at issue. With
that approval, the two companies settled the
litigation, with the branded manufacturer paying
nearly $51 million in additional funds to the generic
manufacturer.
On a motion for partial summary judgment, the
district court determined that the interim
agreement was an illegal restraint of trade and
certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. The
Sixth Circuit held that the interim agreement was
“a naked horizontal restraint of trade that is per
se illegal because it is presumed to have the effect
of reducing competition in the market for [the
branded drug] and its generic equivalents to the
detriment of consumers.” In re Cardizem, No.
00-24836 (6th Cir. June 12, 2003). The court
concluded that the agreement was of the type
that predictably resulted in antitrust injury because
at its core it eliminated competition in the market
for the drug.
In so finding, the court refused to accept a
characterization of the agreement as an attempt
to enforce a patent or to settle litigation. Instead,
it saw the agreement as a way for the branded
manufacturer to share its monopoly profits with
its only potential competitor in an effort to prolong
the patent monopoly as long as possible. “[I]t is
one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that
naturally arises from a patent, but another thing
altogether to bolster the patent’s effectiveness in
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thicket” and create licensing complexities and
costs. In order to address this issue, the Patent
Report recommends a variety of changes in the
existing patent system:
a) The first change would be the introduction of
legislation to create a new administrative
procedure to allow post-grant review of, and
opposition to, patents. This procedure would
be designed to allow for meaningful challenges
to patent validity short of federal court litigation.
b) The second change would be the enactment
of legislation to modify the legal standard
governing challenges to the validity of a patent
from the present “clear and convincing
evidence” to a “preponderance of the
evidence.” According to the Patent Report,
the existing circumstances surrounding the
issuance of a patent by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) suggest that an
overly strong presumption of a patent’s validity
is inappropriate.
c) The third recommended change is a general
tightening in the legal standards used to
evaluate whether an invention is “obvious”
or not, in order to better assure that a
development is significant enough to merit
a patent.
d) Lastly, the Patent Report proposes that the
PTO be provided with the funding necessary
to address issues of patent quality, and that
various PTO procedural rules and regulations
be modified to enable it to improve the process
of patent issuance.
2. Legislation should be enacted to require the
publication of all patent applications 18 months
after the filing of the application. During the time
that otherwise passes between the filing of a
patent application and the issuance of a patent,
an applicant’s competitor could have invested
substantially in designing and developing a product
and bringing it to market, only to discover, once
the patent had finally issued, that it was infringing.
Relatively recently, the law was changed to require
the publishing of all patent applications except
those filed only within the United States. The
Patent Report recommends the elimination of this
exception to publication, in the interests of
increasing business certainty and promoting
rational planning.
3. Legislation should be enacted to create
intervening or prior user rights to protect parties
from infringement allegations that rely on patent
claims first introduced in a continuing or other
similar patent application. The Patent Report
concludes that, if the patent applicant uses
procedures such as continuing applications to
extend the period of patent prosecution, the
potential for anticompetitive hold-up increases.
Intervening or prior-user rights should shelter
inventors and users that infringe a patent only as
a result of claim amendments following a
continuation, provided that the sheltered invention
was developed and used before the amended
claims were published.
4. Legislation should be enacted to require—as
a predicate for liability for willful infringement—
a patentee to either show actual, written notice
of infringement, or to demonstrate that the infringer
deliberately copied the patentee’s invention,
knowing it to be patented. According to the Patent
Report, this requirement would allow firms to read
patents for their disclosure value and to survey
the patent landscape without risking liability for
willful infringement.
5. Finally, the FTC promises to take steps to
increase communication between the antitrust
agencies and the patent institutions. These steps
will include filing amicus briefs in important patent
cases, asking the PTO Director to reexamine
questionable patents that raise competitive
concerns and establishing a Liaison Panel between
the FTC, the DOJ and the PTO.
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inhibiting competition by paying the only potential
competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the
market.” Id.
The challenged agreement in Valley Drug was not
significantly different from the one in Cardizem
in essential respects. In Valley Drug, Abbott
Laboratories, the branded manufacturer, sued
two generic manufacturers—Zenith Goldline
Pharmaceuticals and Geneva Pharmaceuticals—
for patent infringement as they were pursuing
FDA approval for their generic versions of Abbott’s
pioneer drug, Hytrin. Before the termination of
the infringement litigation, Abbott, Zenith and
Geneva entered into interim agreements by which
the generics agreed not to enter the market and
Abbott agreed to make substantial periodic
payments. The payments were to be reduced in
the event another generic entered the market and
were to cease if Abbott ultimately won its patent
suit. Abbott, however, lost the patent litigation at
the district court level in 1998 and after appeal
in 1999. In apparent response to an FTC
investigation, the agreements were terminated in
August 1999.
Unlike the Cardizem court, the Valley Drug court
determined that the alleged exclusionary aspects
of the agreements “are at the heart of the patent
right and cannot trigger the per se label.” Id. In
reversing a grant of partial summary judgment
by the district court, the Eleventh Circuit found
that, because the patent gave Abbott the right to
exclusively market its drug until 2014, any
agreement merely continuing its right to exclusivity
did not necessarily impair competition. “If Abbott
had a lawful right to exclude competitors, it is not
obvious that competition was limited more than
that lawful degree by paying potential competitors
for their exit.” Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharma.,
No. 02-12091 (11th Cir. Sept 15, 2003).
The fact that Abbott’s patent had later been
determined to be invalid was of no relevance to
the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis because the
reasonableness of such agreements is to be
judged at the time the agreements were entered
into. “Exposing settling parties to antitrust liability
for the exclusionary effects of a settlement
reasonably within the scope of the patent merely
because the patent is subsequently declared invalid
would undermine the patent incentives.” Id.
As a result, the case was remanded to the district
court to determine the actual competitive effects
of the agreements in light of all the circumstances.
“To hold that an ostensibly reasonable settlement
of patent litigation gives rise to per se antitrust
liability if it involves any payment by the patentee
would obviously chill such settlements, thereby
increasing the cost of patent enforcement and
decreasing the value of patent protection
generally.” Id.
These two conflicting opinions create considerable
uncertainty for parties settling patent infringement
suits (or entering into agreements pending the
outcome of the litigation) in similar circumstances.
They suggest the need for great care in crafting
such settlements because both private litigation
and government investigations may result.
FTC Clarifies Use of Monetary
Remedies in Competition
Cases
The FTC recently issued a policy statement on
the use of monetary equitable remedies such as
disgorgement and restitution in competition cases.
While the Commission will continue to rely primarily
on traditional, prospective remedies, the statement
suggests that disgorgement and restitution will
be sought in “exceptional” circumstances. Three
factors are identified that will be considered in
this determination.  First, whether the underlying
violation is clear. Second, whether there is a
reasonable basis for calculating the amount of
the remedial payment. Third, whether other
4
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Obviously many of these recommendations would
result in significant changes to both patent law
and practice, affecting a wide variety of industries.
Whether Congress shares the FTC’s concerns,
and is ready to enact major legislation to address
those concerns, remains to be seen.
Circuits Disagree over Per
Se Treatment of Agreements to
Settle Patent Infringement Suits
Two United States circuit courts of appeals have
reached opposite conclusions regarding the
appropriate antitrust analysis to apply to a payment
by a patent holder to an alleged infringer in settling
patent infringement litigation. First, in June, the
Sixth Circuit found such payments (and the
settlement agreements incorporating them) to be
per se illegal under the antitrust laws. In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, No. 00-24836
(6th Cir. June 13, 2003). More recently, the
Eleventh Circuit declined to find similar a patent
infringement settlement per se illegal even though
the patent holder paid the alleged infringers and
the patent was later held invalid. Valley Drug Co.
v. Geneva Pharma., No. 02-12091 (11th Cir. Sept
15, 2003). The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged
that its analysis ran contrary to the Sixth Circuit.
The split in the circuits on this issue may ultimately
invite Supreme Court review.
In the case before the Sixth Circuit, Hoescht
Marion Roussel, the manufacturer of the
prescription drug Cardizem CD, sued Andrx
Pharmaceuticals—then a potential manufacturer
of a generic version of that drug—in January
1996, alleging patent infringement. While the
litigation was pending, the FDA approved the
generic version, allowing it to go to market at the
latest in July 1998 and perhaps sooner if the
litigation resulted in a finding of non-infringement.
Shortly after the FDA decision, the two companies
entered an interim agreement by which the
branded manufacturer agreed to pay the generic
manufacturer $40 million per year, payable
quarterly, from July 1998 until the termination of
the litigation. In return, the generic manufacturer
agreed not to bring its generic product to market
even though, under the law, the generic product
could have been marketed from that date forward
(subject, of course, to damages for infringement
if the litigation resulted in a finding of patent
infringement).
The litigation finally ended in June 1999 when
the FDA approved a reformulated version of the
generic drug that the generic manufacturer
certified did not infringe the patent at issue. With
that approval, the two companies settled the
litigation, with the branded manufacturer paying
nearly $51 million in additional funds to the generic
manufacturer.
On a motion for partial summary judgment, the
district court determined that the interim
agreement was an illegal restraint of trade and
certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. The
Sixth Circuit held that the interim agreement was
“a naked horizontal restraint of trade that is per
se illegal because it is presumed to have the effect
of reducing competition in the market for [the
branded drug] and its generic equivalents to the
detriment of consumers.” In re Cardizem, No.
00-24836 (6th Cir. June 12, 2003). The court
concluded that the agreement was of the type
that predictably resulted in antitrust injury because
at its core it eliminated competition in the market
for the drug.
In so finding, the court refused to accept a
characterization of the agreement as an attempt
to enforce a patent or to settle litigation. Instead,
it saw the agreement as a way for the branded
manufacturer to share its monopoly profits with
its only potential competitor in an effort to prolong
the patent monopoly as long as possible. “[I]t is
one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that
naturally arises from a patent, but another thing
altogether to bolster the patent’s effectiveness in
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thicket” and create licensing complexities and
costs. In order to address this issue, the Patent
Report recommends a variety of changes in the
existing patent system:
a) The first change would be the introduction of
legislation to create a new administrative
procedure to allow post-grant review of, and
opposition to, patents. This procedure would
be designed to allow for meaningful challenges
to patent validity short of federal court litigation.
b) The second change would be the enactment
of legislation to modify the legal standard
governing challenges to the validity of a patent
from the present “clear and convincing
evidence” to a “preponderance of the
evidence.” According to the Patent Report,
the existing circumstances surrounding the
issuance of a patent by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) suggest that an
overly strong presumption of a patent’s validity
is inappropriate.
c) The third recommended change is a general
tightening in the legal standards used to
evaluate whether an invention is “obvious”
or not, in order to better assure that a
development is significant enough to merit
a patent.
d) Lastly, the Patent Report proposes that the
PTO be provided with the funding necessary
to address issues of patent quality, and that
various PTO procedural rules and regulations
be modified to enable it to improve the process
of patent issuance.
2. Legislation should be enacted to require the
publication of all patent applications 18 months
after the filing of the application. During the time
that otherwise passes between the filing of a
patent application and the issuance of a patent,
an applicant’s competitor could have invested
substantially in designing and developing a product
and bringing it to market, only to discover, once
the patent had finally issued, that it was infringing.
Relatively recently, the law was changed to require
the publishing of all patent applications except
those filed only within the United States. The
Patent Report recommends the elimination of this
exception to publication, in the interests of
increasing business certainty and promoting
rational planning.
3. Legislation should be enacted to create
intervening or prior user rights to protect parties
from infringement allegations that rely on patent
claims first introduced in a continuing or other
similar patent application. The Patent Report
concludes that, if the patent applicant uses
procedures such as continuing applications to
extend the period of patent prosecution, the
potential for anticompetitive hold-up increases.
Intervening or prior-user rights should shelter
inventors and users that infringe a patent only as
a result of claim amendments following a
continuation, provided that the sheltered invention
was developed and used before the amended
claims were published.
4. Legislation should be enacted to require—as
a predicate for liability for willful infringement—
a patentee to either show actual, written notice
of infringement, or to demonstrate that the infringer
deliberately copied the patentee’s invention,
knowing it to be patented. According to the Patent
Report, this requirement would allow firms to read
patents for their disclosure value and to survey
the patent landscape without risking liability for
willful infringement.
5. Finally, the FTC promises to take steps to
increase communication between the antitrust
agencies and the patent institutions. These steps
will include filing amicus briefs in important patent
cases, asking the PTO Director to reexamine
questionable patents that raise competitive
concerns and establishing a Liaison Panel between
the FTC, the DOJ and the PTO.
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inhibiting competition by paying the only potential
competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the
market.” Id.
The challenged agreement in Valley Drug was not
significantly different from the one in Cardizem
in essential respects. In Valley Drug, Abbott
Laboratories, the branded manufacturer, sued
two generic manufacturers—Zenith Goldline
Pharmaceuticals and Geneva Pharmaceuticals—
for patent infringement as they were pursuing
FDA approval for their generic versions of Abbott’s
pioneer drug, Hytrin. Before the termination of
the infringement litigation, Abbott, Zenith and
Geneva entered into interim agreements by which
the generics agreed not to enter the market and
Abbott agreed to make substantial periodic
payments. The payments were to be reduced in
the event another generic entered the market and
were to cease if Abbott ultimately won its patent
suit. Abbott, however, lost the patent litigation at
the district court level in 1998 and after appeal
in 1999. In apparent response to an FTC
investigation, the agreements were terminated in
August 1999.
Unlike the Cardizem court, the Valley Drug court
determined that the alleged exclusionary aspects
of the agreements “are at the heart of the patent
right and cannot trigger the per se label.” Id. In
reversing a grant of partial summary judgment
by the district court, the Eleventh Circuit found
that, because the patent gave Abbott the right to
exclusively market its drug until 2014, any
agreement merely continuing its right to exclusivity
did not necessarily impair competition. “If Abbott
had a lawful right to exclude competitors, it is not
obvious that competition was limited more than
that lawful degree by paying potential competitors
for their exit.” Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharma.,
No. 02-12091 (11th Cir. Sept 15, 2003).
The fact that Abbott’s patent had later been
determined to be invalid was of no relevance to
the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis because the
reasonableness of such agreements is to be
judged at the time the agreements were entered
into. “Exposing settling parties to antitrust liability
for the exclusionary effects of a settlement
reasonably within the scope of the patent merely
because the patent is subsequently declared invalid
would undermine the patent incentives.” Id.
As a result, the case was remanded to the district
court to determine the actual competitive effects
of the agreements in light of all the circumstances.
“To hold that an ostensibly reasonable settlement
of patent litigation gives rise to per se antitrust
liability if it involves any payment by the patentee
would obviously chill such settlements, thereby
increasing the cost of patent enforcement and
decreasing the value of patent protection
generally.” Id.
These two conflicting opinions create considerable
uncertainty for parties settling patent infringement
suits (or entering into agreements pending the
outcome of the litigation) in similar circumstances.
They suggest the need for great care in crafting
such settlements because both private litigation
and government investigations may result.
FTC Clarifies Use of Monetary
Remedies in Competition
Cases
The FTC recently issued a policy statement on
the use of monetary equitable remedies such as
disgorgement and restitution in competition cases.
While the Commission will continue to rely primarily
on traditional, prospective remedies, the statement
suggests that disgorgement and restitution will
be sought in “exceptional” circumstances. Three
factors are identified that will be considered in
this determination.  First, whether the underlying
violation is clear. Second, whether there is a
reasonable basis for calculating the amount of
the remedial payment. Third, whether other
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Anthony. Commissioner Harbour, an independent,
has most recently been in private practice and is
a former New York assistant first deputy attorney
general. Her term extends until September 2009.
Joseph J. Simmons recently resigned his position
as the director of the Bureau of Competition.
Simmons presided over 60 enforcement actions
during his two years at the Commission, including
25 non-merger cases and two challenges to
consummated mergers. Susan Creighton has
been named the new director of the Bureau of
Competition. Creighton has been deputy director
since August 2001, when she joined the FTC.
She previously clerked for Judge Pamela Ann
Rymer in the Central District of California and
Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.
Barry Nigro, Ann Malester and Bruce Hoffman
all have become deputy directors of the Bureau
of Competition. Nigro joins the FTC from private
practice. Malester has led one of the merger
groups within the FTC for a number of years.
Hoffman has been the associate director for
regional litigation for the past two years.
David Scheffman resigned his position as director
of the Bureau of Economics. Scheffman, who
served as director for two years, will return to the
private sector as an economic consultant and
adjunct professor at Vanderbilt University. Luke
Froeb will replace Scheffman. Froeb joins the
FTC from the Owen Graduate School of
Management at Vanderbilt University. Froeb was
previously an economist with the Antitrust Division.
The FTC recently enhanced its intellectual property
expertise, evidencing yet more institutional interest
in this subject. Armando Irizarry and Thomas
Mays joined as counsels for intellectual property.
Irizarry comes from Michigan State University,
where he was teaching law.
Mays joins the Commission from private practice
and was previously a patent examiner at the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office.
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FTC Releases Report on
Intellectual Property and
Antitrust
Last year the FTC and the Department of Justice
jointly held hearings focused on the current
balance of competition and patent law and policy.
(See our December, 2001 Antitrust and Trade
Regulation Bulletin at www.haledorr.com/antitrust.)
The hearings spanned more than 24 days,
involving more than 300 panelists and 100
separate written submissions. The first tangible
by-product of those sessions came on October
28, 2003, with the release of a 266-page FTC
report containing specific recommendations for
changes in the existing patent system (the Patent
Report)(http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/creport
.htm). A second, joint report with DOJ, containing
specific recommendations for antitrust, is promised
for the future.  
The Patent Report begins with a general discussion
of the common aims of both competition and
patent law and policy. Competition stimulates
innovation by spurring the innovation of new or
better products or more efficient processes. Patent
policy can also stimulate innovation by rewarding
the innovator with a right to exclude others from
making, using or selling the invention claimed by
the patent. As the FTC sees it, the two systems
are not inherently in conflict, but any failure to
strike the appropriate balance between them can
harm innovation.
Although the Patent Report states that “for the
most part” the patent system achieves a proper
balance with competition policy, it concludes that
in some ways the system is “out of balance.” As
a result, the report makes a number of specific
recommendations for reforming the legal systems,
procedures and institutions of the patent system.
Most, but not all, of the proposals would require
enabling legislation. The FTC’s recommendations
include the following:
1. Measures should be implemented to reduce
the number of invalid patents issued or those that
contain claims that are overly broad. These poor
quality or questionable patents can cause
competitors to forgo R&D in the areas the patent
improperly covers, and can increase the practice
of “defensive patenting,” contribute to the “patent
FTC recommends
sweeping changes
in the balance
between competition
and patent law.
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remedies available are likely to fail to fully
accomplish the purposes of the antitrust laws.
For parties to consummated mergers challenged
after closing, for example, this means that the
agency may seek not only to dissolve the
transaction but also, in “exceptional”
circumstances, to have the parties repay profits
earned while operating as a merged company.
However, as with all such statements of policy,
the true import of this pronouncement will not be
known until the FTC puts it into practice.
ABA Publishes Updated
HSR Manual
The Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar
Association has published the third edition of the
Premerger Notification Practice Manual. The
manual provides summaries and discussions of
both the informal interpretations of the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR
or the Act) given by the Premerger Notification
Office of the Federal Trade Commission (PNO)
and enforcement actions brought by the antitrust
agencies related to the Act. Hy David Rubenstein
of Hale and Dorr LLP’s Antitrust and Trade
Regulation Group, formerly an attorney with the
PNO, was a member of the working group that
developed and edited the third edition.
The Act authorizes the PNO to provide informal,
typically oral, interpretations as well as formal
written interpretations of HSR issues. Although
the PNO has issued only 17 formal written
interpretations in the 27 years since the Act was
passed, the office has issued thousands of informal
oral interpretations. Many of these oral
interpretations have been confirmed in written
correspondence to the PNO. These written
confirmations formed the basis of the first two
editions of the manual, published in 1985 and
1991. This third edition of the manual continues
to be the most comprehensive published source
for such information to date. In addition, the
editors of this edition collaborated with the PNO
on the preparation of a discussion of other issues
that have not been the subject of written
confirmation.
Although the manual brings the materials
completely up-to-date, incorporating the PNO’s
latest positions on various issues and adding
summaries of interpretations relating to changes
that have occurred in the HSR laws since 1991,
new rules and interpretations of the Act are
constantly occurring. As a result, parties requiring
advice on HSR issues should continue to consult
with antitrust counsel.
Personnel Changes at Both
Antitrust Agencies
Department of Justice
Bruce McDonald recently joined the DOJ and will
serve as the deputy assistant attorney general for
regulatory matters in the Antitrust Division,
overseeing airline, transportation, energy and
other regulatory matters. McDonald was formerly
in private practice. Robert Kramer, a career
attorney with the Division and for many years
chief of one of its litigation sections, succeeds
Connie Robinson as director of operations.
Deborah Majoras, principal deputy attorney
general for Antitrust, recently announced her
intention to leave DOJ and is expected to rejoin
the private bar next year. Majoras joined the
Division in the spring of 2001 and was involved
in the General Electric–Honeywell International
and Microsoft cases.
Federal Trade Commission
Commissioner Sheila Foster Anthony served on
the Commission for nearly six years until her term
expired recently. Often a dissenting voice,
Commissioner Anthony disagreed with other
commissioners in the cruise industry consolidation,
and in the PepsiCo–Quaker Oats (Gatorade) and
General Mills–Pillsbury merger decisions. Pamela
Jones Harbour recently replaced Commissioner
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Anthony. Commissioner Harbour, an independent,
has most recently been in private practice and is
a former New York assistant first deputy attorney
general. Her term extends until September 2009.
Joseph J. Simmons recently resigned his position
as the director of the Bureau of Competition.
Simmons presided over 60 enforcement actions
during his two years at the Commission, including
25 non-merger cases and two challenges to
consummated mergers. Susan Creighton has
been named the new director of the Bureau of
Competition. Creighton has been deputy director
since August 2001, when she joined the FTC.
She previously clerked for Judge Pamela Ann
Rymer in the Central District of California and
Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.
Barry Nigro, Ann Malester and Bruce Hoffman
all have become deputy directors of the Bureau
of Competition. Nigro joins the FTC from private
practice. Malester has led one of the merger
groups within the FTC for a number of years.
Hoffman has been the associate director for
regional litigation for the past two years.
David Scheffman resigned his position as director
of the Bureau of Economics. Scheffman, who
served as director for two years, will return to the
private sector as an economic consultant and
adjunct professor at Vanderbilt University. Luke
Froeb will replace Scheffman. Froeb joins the
FTC from the Owen Graduate School of
Management at Vanderbilt University. Froeb was
previously an economist with the Antitrust Division.
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expertise, evidencing yet more institutional interest
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Irizarry comes from Michigan State University,
where he was teaching law.
Mays joins the Commission from private practice
and was previously a patent examiner at the U.S.
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(See our December, 2001 Antitrust and Trade
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The hearings spanned more than 24 days,
involving more than 300 panelists and 100
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by-product of those sessions came on October
28, 2003, with the release of a 266-page FTC
report containing specific recommendations for
changes in the existing patent system (the Patent
Report)(http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/creport
.htm). A second, joint report with DOJ, containing
specific recommendations for antitrust, is promised
for the future.  
The Patent Report begins with a general discussion
of the common aims of both competition and
patent law and policy. Competition stimulates
innovation by spurring the innovation of new or
better products or more efficient processes. Patent
policy can also stimulate innovation by rewarding
the innovator with a right to exclude others from
making, using or selling the invention claimed by
the patent. As the FTC sees it, the two systems
are not inherently in conflict, but any failure to
strike the appropriate balance between them can
harm innovation.
Although the Patent Report states that “for the
most part” the patent system achieves a proper
balance with competition policy, it concludes that
in some ways the system is “out of balance.” As
a result, the report makes a number of specific
recommendations for reforming the legal systems,
procedures and institutions of the patent system.
Most, but not all, of the proposals would require
enabling legislation. The FTC’s recommendations
include the following:
1. Measures should be implemented to reduce
the number of invalid patents issued or those that
contain claims that are overly broad. These poor
quality or questionable patents can cause
competitors to forgo R&D in the areas the patent
improperly covers, and can increase the practice
of “defensive patenting,” contribute to the “patent
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remedies available are likely to fail to fully
accomplish the purposes of the antitrust laws.
For parties to consummated mergers challenged
after closing, for example, this means that the
agency may seek not only to dissolve the
transaction but also, in “exceptional”
circumstances, to have the parties repay profits
earned while operating as a merged company.
However, as with all such statements of policy,
the true import of this pronouncement will not be
known until the FTC puts it into practice.
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The Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar
Association has published the third edition of the
Premerger Notification Practice Manual. The
manual provides summaries and discussions of
both the informal interpretations of the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR
or the Act) given by the Premerger Notification
Office of the Federal Trade Commission (PNO)
and enforcement actions brought by the antitrust
agencies related to the Act. Hy David Rubenstein
of Hale and Dorr LLP’s Antitrust and Trade
Regulation Group, formerly an attorney with the
PNO, was a member of the working group that
developed and edited the third edition.
The Act authorizes the PNO to provide informal,
typically oral, interpretations as well as formal
written interpretations of HSR issues. Although
the PNO has issued only 17 formal written
interpretations in the 27 years since the Act was
passed, the office has issued thousands of informal
oral interpretations. Many of these oral
interpretations have been confirmed in written
correspondence to the PNO. These written
confirmations formed the basis of the first two
editions of the manual, published in 1985 and
1991. This third edition of the manual continues
to be the most comprehensive published source
for such information to date. In addition, the
editors of this edition collaborated with the PNO
on the preparation of a discussion of other issues
that have not been the subject of written
confirmation.
Although the manual brings the materials
completely up-to-date, incorporating the PNO’s
latest positions on various issues and adding
summaries of interpretations relating to changes
that have occurred in the HSR laws since 1991,
new rules and interpretations of the Act are
constantly occurring. As a result, parties requiring
advice on HSR issues should continue to consult
with antitrust counsel.
Personnel Changes at Both
Antitrust Agencies
Department of Justice
Bruce McDonald recently joined the DOJ and will
serve as the deputy assistant attorney general for
regulatory matters in the Antitrust Division,
overseeing airline, transportation, energy and
other regulatory matters. McDonald was formerly
in private practice. Robert Kramer, a career
attorney with the Division and for many years
chief of one of its litigation sections, succeeds
Connie Robinson as director of operations.
Deborah Majoras, principal deputy attorney
general for Antitrust, recently announced her
intention to leave DOJ and is expected to rejoin
the private bar next year. Majoras joined the
Division in the spring of 2001 and was involved
in the General Electric–Honeywell International
and Microsoft cases.
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